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For decades conservative leaders within the federal govern-
ment have sought to block grant entitlement programs, the 
foremost among them being Medicaid.1 As history tends to repeat 
itself, the election of a Republican President and Republican 
 
 1. See JOHN HOLAHAN & MATTHEW BUETTGENS, URB. INST., BLOCK GRANTS AND PER 
CAPITA CAPS THE PROBLEM OF FUNDING DISPARITIES AMONG STATES 1 (2016), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/83921/2000912-Block-Grants-and 
-Per-Capita-Caps-the-Problem-of-Funding-Disparities-among-States.pdf [hereinafter BLOCK 
GRANTS AND PER CAPITA CAPS] (“Over the past 25 years, various Congressional leaders have 
called for Medicaid financing to be reformed with either block grants or per capita caps.”); 
see also A BETTER WAY, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA 25 (2016), 
https://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-HealthCare-PolicyPaper.pdf 
[hereinafter A BETTER WAY]; Jeanne M. Lambrew, Making Medicaid a Block Grant Program: An 
Analysis of the Implications of Past Proposals, 83 MILBANK Q. 41, 45 (2005) (“President Reagan 
proposed changing Medicaid into a block grant program in 1981, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives Newt Gingrich proposed it in 1995, and President Bush proposed it in 2003. 
President George H.W. Bush also considered the idea but withdrew it before it was drawn 
up as a specific program.”); see generally Michael S. Sparer, Medicaid at 50: Remarkable Growth 
Fueled by Unexpected Politics, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1084-89 (2015) (providing a comprehensive 
history of the Medicaid program). 
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majorities in both the Senate and House of Representatives have led 
to renewed calls to block grant Medicaid.2 Block grant proponents 
advocate the necessity of the change by highlighting the virtues of 
block grants; specifically, that block grant implementation will 
provide states flexibility in their Medicaid program3 while simul-
taneously encouraging fiscal prudence in this program that is often 
accused of significant excesses.4 Block grant proponents argue that 
restored state flexibility and enhanced fiscal prudence will best 
serve the interests of Medicaid beneficiaries.5 
The current structure of Medicaid guarantees coverage to 
qualified low-income individuals and guarantees federal matching 
payments to states without any preset enrollment limits.6 The 
 
 2. See, e.g., Joseph R. Antos & James C. Capretta, The Graham-Cassidy Plan: Sweeping 
Changes in a Compressed Time Frame, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170922.062134/full/; Aaron E. Carroll, 
How Would Republican Plans for Medicaid Block Grants Actually Work?, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT 
(Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/upshot/how-would-republican-plans 
-for-medicaid-block-grants-actually-work.html; Ryan LaRochelle, The GOP Plan to Fund 
Medicaid Through Block Grants Will Probably Weaken It, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/18/republicans-want 
-to-fund-medicaid-through-block-grants-thats-a-problem/?utm_term=.f33c2a0f42ed; Shefali 
Luthra, Block Grants Are the Heart of GOP’s Medicaid Plans. Here’s How They Work, PBS: NEWS 
HOUR (Jan. 25, 2017, 10:16 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/block-grants 
-republican-medicaid; Vann R. Newkirk II, Republicans’ New Plan to Gut Public Insurance, 
ATLANTIC: POLITICS (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017 
/02/house-gop-obamacare-plan-block-grants/517104/. 
 3. See A BETTER WAY, supra note 1, at 25 (“All states should have more flexibility to 
adapt their Medicaid programs, to better design benefit packages in a way that better meets 
the needs of their state populations, promotes personal responsibility and healthy behaviors, 
and encourages a more holistic approach to care.”); Lambrew, supra note 1, at 42 (“Advocates 
of block grants make two claims. The first is the idea of federalism, or giving control of the 
grants to the states.”). 
 4. See A BETTER WAY, supra note 1, at 23 (“Many state Medicaid programs suffer from 
significant waste, fraud, and abuse, due to failures in state and federal oversight.”); 
Lambrew, supra note 1, at 43 (“A second argument for block grants is that they would 
eliminate the ‘uncontrollable’ aspects of entitlement programs. Congress sets in advance the 
maximum amount of federal block grant spending, which offers both predictability and a 
relatively easy way to adjust the program’s spending to meet broader budget goals.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 5. See A BETTER WAY, supra note 1, at 28 (“This approach allows states to design 
programs to best meet the unique needs of their citizens.”). 
 6. See ROBIN RUDOWITZ, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS 
2 (2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Medicaid-Financing-The-Basics [here-
inafter MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS]; see also CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAID 2 (2016), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files 
/policybasics-medicaid_0.pdf [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAID] (“Medicaid is an 
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receipt of federal funding is conditional upon the states meeting a 
broad range of federal requirements.7 Generally, these require-
ments consist of states providing specific services to qualified 
populations (almost unanimously the poor) without limitations.8 
The federal matching also covers other “optional” populations; 
consequently, this allows states to qualify different population 
groups, such as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) expansion group, 
as Medicaid beneficiaries.9 The federal share of matching payments 
 
‘entitlement’ program, which means that anyone who meets eligibility rules has a right to 
enroll in Medicaid coverage. It also means that states have guaranteed federal financial 
support for part of the cost of their Medicaid programs.”); KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & 
UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., IMPLICATIONS OF A FEDERAL BLOCK GRANT FOR 
MEDICAID 1 (2011), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8173.pdf 
[hereinafter IMPLICATIONS OF A FEDERAL BLOCK GRANT FOR MEDICAID] (“Medicaid covers 
low-income individuals who meet categorical and income standards including children and 
parents, individuals with diverse physical and mental conditions and disabilities, 
and seniors.”). 
 7. See MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 2; see also INTRODUCTION TO 
MEDICAID, supra note 6, at 2. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities indicates that the 
mandatory populations a state must cover, to qualify for federal funding, include: 
• children through age 18 in families with income below 138 percent of the 
federal poverty line ($25,975 for a family of three in 2013); 
• pregnant women with income below 138 percent of the poverty line; 
• parents whose income is within the state’s eligibility limit for cash assistance 
that was in place prior to welfare reform; and 
• most seniors and persons with disabilities who receive cash assistance through 
the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. 
Id. 
 8. See MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 2; see also SARA ROSENBAUM 
ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, WHAT WOULD BLOCK GRANTS OR LIMITS ON PER CAPITA 
SPENDING MEAN FOR MEDICAID? 1 (2016), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media 
/files/publications/issue-brief/2016/nov/1913_rosenbaum_medicaid_block_grants.pdf 
(“Medicaid has transformed from a niche program to become a linchpin of the U.S. health 
care system. It is today the largest single insurer, serving nearly 73 million low-income and 
medically vulnerable individuals, many of whom would go without needed care or face 
severe financial hardship without this coverage.”). 
 9. See MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 2; see also INTRODUCTION TO 
MEDICAID, supra note 6, at 2. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities outlined Medicaid 
policy in regard to optional populations, explaining: 
States may also receive federal Medicaid funds to cover “optional” populations, 
including: pregnant women, children, and parents with income above 
”mandatory” coverage income limits; seniors and persons with disabilities with 
income below the poverty line; ”medically needy” people (those whose income 
exceeds the state’s regular Medicaid eligibility limit but who have high medical 
expenses, such as for nursing home care, that reduce their disposable income 
below the eligibility limit); and newly under health reform, near-poor non-
disabled adults without children. 
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varies by state—depending on the specific state and the identified 
population group.10  
Specifically, the federal government provides a matched share 
of payments to states for the traditional Medicaid population.11 The 
matching percentage is determined statutorily, based on the state’s 
per capita income, which varied from a floor of 50% to a maximum 
of 74% in 2017.12 For specific subsets of the population, the federal 
government might follow another formula. As an example, for the 
Medicaid expansion populations under the ACA, the federal 
government paid 100% of the costs to include the expansion 
population through 2016, with its share being gradually reduced to 
90% by 2020.13 
Block granting Medicaid would transform its structure from a 
federal open-ended, matched funding entitlement program into a 
program where states receive a predetermined, fixed amount of 
funds, based only on the historical expenditures of the specific 
state.14 The rationale behind this change is that the federal 
requirements will be disregarded in favor of state flexibility (with a 
more favorable state “formula”).15 However, switching Medicaid to 
 
Id. The fact that Medicaid covers vulnerable populations has saved the program from 
previous attempts to block grant its funding. See Lambrew, supra note 1, at 42. 
 10. See MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 2 (“The federal share of 
Medicaid is determined by a formula set in statute that is based on a state’s per capita income. 
The formula is designed so that the federal government pays a larger share of program costs 
in poorer states.”). 
 11. See id. 
 12. MISS. DIV. OF MEDICAID, MISSISSIPPI MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW AND PROGRAM 
BASICS 1 (2017), https://medicaid.ms.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/2017-Medicaid 
-Fact-Sheet.pdf; see also MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 2 (“The federal 
share (FMAP) varies by state from a floor of 50% to a high of 74% in 2017, and states may 
receive higher FMAPs for certain services or populations.”). 
 13. See MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 2; see also INTRODUCTION TO 
MEDICAID, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
 14. See EDWIN PARK, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT 
WOULD SLASH FEDERAL FUNDING, SHIFT COSTS TO STATES, AND LEAVE MILLIONS MORE 
UNINSURED 1 (2016), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-30-16health 
_0.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT WOULD SLASH FEDERAL FUNDING]; see also 
Lambrew, supra note 1, at 42 (“Medicaid guarantees that certain low-income and disabled 
persons receive a set of comprehensive health benefits defined by federal and state law. The 
funding for such services rises and falls according to need. Under a block grant plan, 
however, the situation would be reversed.”). 
 15. See ROBERT JAY DILGER & EUGENE BOYD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BLOCK GRANTS: 
PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES 3 (2014) [hereinafter BLOCK GRANTS: PERSPECTIVES AND 
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a state block grant, with the accompanying loss of the federal 
entitlement, would likely cause other fundamental changes, 
including a lack of guaranteed coverage to otherwise qualified 
individuals16 and capped federal funding (not based on enrollment 
or program needs)17 set only to fixed, pre-set growth factors such 
as the consumer price index.18 Furthermore, all Medicaid block 
grant proposals employ a grant growth rate set below the medical 
inflation rate projected by the Congressional Budget Office or the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services for the Medicaid 
program—thereby creating the intended federal savings over 
time.19 This block granting structure, however, would impede 
Medicaid’s function of providing a healthcare safety net for the 
poor.20 Specifically, the touted methods aimed at promoting 
flexibility and financial prudence would likely result in cuts to 
beneficiary enrollment and benefits.21 
 
CONTROVERSIES]. Dilger and Boyd describe the nature of the “formula” for a block grant with 
the following: 
Federal administrators have a low degree of discretion over who receives block 
grants (after setting aside funding for administration and other specified activities, 
the remaining funds are typically allocated automatically to recipients by a 
formula or formulas specified in legislation); recipients have some discretion 
concerning aided activities (typically, funds can be used for a specified range of 
activities within a single functional area); and there is a moderate degree of federal 
administrative conditions attached to the grant, typically involving more than 
periodic reporting criteria and the application of standard government accounting 
procedures, but with fewer conditions attached to the grant than project 
categorical grants. 
Id. 
 16. See BLOCK GRANTS AND PER CAPITA CAPS, supra note 1, at 2 (“Block grants would 
end Medicaid’s open-ended matching structure whereby states receive federal matching 
payments based on their expenditures.”). 
 17. See MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT WOULD SLASH FEDERAL FUNDING, supra note 14, at 3 
(“This could include using waiting lists or capping enrollment; under current law, all eligible 
individuals who apply for Medicaid must be allowed to enroll.”). 
 18. See BLOCK GRANTS AND PER CAPITA CAPS, supra note 1, at 3. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2017), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/fact-sheet-medicaid-state-US [hereinafter MEDICAID IN THE 
UNITED STATES]. 
 21. See MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT WOULD SLASH FEDERAL FUNDING, supra note 14, at 3 
(“To compensate for . . . funding cuts a block grant would institute, states would either have 
to contribute much more of their own funding or, as is far more likely, use the greater 
flexibility the block grant would give them to make draconian cuts to eligibility, benefits, 
and provider payments.”). 
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While other Medicaid block grant literature has been limited 
primarily to the projected consequences of instituting a Medicaid 
block grant,22 this Note will attempt to fill a gap in the literature by 
evaluating the legal and policy mechanisms behind the block grant 
proponent’s claims of increased state flexibility and enhanced fiscal 
prudence. Finding the legal and policy mechanisms endorsed by 
Medicaid block granting proponents incorrect, this Note will argue 
that both conservative and liberal Medicaid objectives can be 
reached—achieving state flexibility with fiscal prudence while not 
reducing the accumulative Medicaid population or specific 
coverage benefits—by formulating Medicaid law around the policy 
that early treatments of diseases provide significant savings 
without requiring cuts to coverage. Ironically, the actual objectives 
sought through block granting Medicaid are best achieved by 
completely abandoning the block grant proposal in lieu of laws 
based on this policy that provides earlier treatments and expansive 
coverage to more people. 
This Note will proceed as follows: Part I will explore the state 
flexibility rationale for Medicaid block granting—including 
increased state Medicaid freedom, effectiveness, and innovation—
and suggest that block granting would actually frustrate these 
objectives. Part II examines the other purported aim of Medicaid 
block grants, the promotion of fiscal prudence, and argues that 
block granting would ultimately undermine state economies. The 
states, because of legal impediments, would not be able to 
compensate for fiscal shortfalls created by a block grant. Part II will 
also introduce the idea of implementing policies that increase 
coverage to beneficiaries by arguing that expanded coverage 
creates immediate economic benefits, with such early treatment 
also providing significant downstream savings to the government. 
These savings will promote what block granting proponents seek: 
long-term planning, streamlining of duplicative programs, and 
limits on uncontrollable costs—making the choice to expand 
Medicaid coverage the superior option. Part III concludes by 
 
 22. Reasons for this omission in literature appear to be based on the difficulties of 
analyzing a non-existent policy. See, e.g., Lambrew, supra note 1, at 42 (“Beyond simulations, 
the idea of converting Medicaid to a block grant has not been well studied. Indeed, it is 
difficult to assess the implications of a policy that does not now exist and for which there are 
few analogues.”). 
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suggesting that despite Medicaid’s vulnerability to calls for moving 
to a block granting approach, there is reason to be optimistic for the 
future of Medicaid. 
I. STATE FLEXIBILITY 
Highlighting the historical roots of federalism as justification, 
block grant proponents seek to provide states wide discretion in 
their Medicaid block grant implementation.23 This is a significant 
change as the benefits of the Medicaid program have, over time, 
become entrenched in society and have become “programmatic 
rights”—rights that are administered via a joint government 
program as the products of congressional enactment and judicial 
interpretation.24 Further illustrating the societal entrenchment of 
programmatic rights, the Supreme Court has suggested, in dicta, 
that welfare entitlements might be property rights.25 Consequently, 
switching Medicaid from a federal entitlement into a state program 
will lead to an argument on how increased state flexibility will 
impact Medicaid beneficiaries’ programmatic rights.26  
 
 23. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the Cooperative Federalism of America’s 
Public Income Transfer Programs, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 140 (1996) (“Federalism is also 
often praised for providing variety in government, thereby giving people with different 
tastes reason to live in one locale or another—although this idea is traditionally more 
frequently applied to local variation, not so much to state-to-state variation.”); see also 
Lambrew, supra note 1, at 44 (describing the differences among states in their desire for 
control over their Medicaid program, with some wishing for more control, while others seek 
to relinquish control to the federal government). 
 24. See R. Shep Melnick, Federalism and the New Rights, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 
327 (1996) (“Unlike the rights of free speech, religion, property, and privacy, which set limits 
on the power of government officials, programmatic rights require extensive public 
programs rather than private autonomy, a welfare state rather than limited government.”). 
 25. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (“It may be realistic today to 
regard welfare entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’ Much of the existing 
wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-
law concepts of property.”). 
 26. See Melnick, supra note 24, at 326. Melnick adds clarity and caution to the idea of 
federalism being used to promote policy change with the following statement: 
In short, in the US debates about federalism are seldom merely matters of 
efficiency, management, or finding the most convenient means for achieving 
agreed-upon ends. These debates are often proxies for broader arguments about 
the proper role of government. This should make us ponder what the current trend 
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The following sections will argue that the specific types of 
Medicaid flexibility that proponents claim states will experience 
with block grants—(1) expanding state freedom, (2) incentivizing 
program effectiveness, and (3) fostering state innovation—will each 
actually limit state flexibility and obstruct beneficiaries’ program-
matic rights as they are currently enjoyed. 
A. State Freedom 
A repeated argument against the current entitlement structure 
of Medicaid is that it constrains state policy-making.27 Currently, 
states are bound to federal requirements such as mandating 
essential services and covering specific population groups.28 
Additionally, the statutory requirements of Medicaid provide that 
all who meet specific income criteria qualify for coverage.29 The 
statutory requirements also enable beneficiaries to defend in 
federal court their “enforceable rights” against state action that 
could unlawfully harm their interests.30  
While acknowledged as a “cooperative” program between 
states and the federal government, proponents of Medicaid block 
grants argue the actual result is a federal program administered by 
the state that is accompanied with strict requirements in exchange 
for a set amount of resources.31 Proponents also contend that this 
 
 27. See A BETTER WAY, supra note 1, at 12. The current Republican proposal 
has outlined: 
  States have been in the business of regulating health insurance for decades. 
They should be empowered to make the right tradeoffs between consumer 
protections and individual choice, not regulators in Washington. The federal role 
should be minimal and set a few broadly shared goals, while state governments 
determine how best to implement those goals in their own markets. 
Id.; see also Lambrew, supra note 1, at 44 (“Medicaid has been the target of block grant 
proponents in part because of the inherent tension in the federal-state partnership.”). 
 28. See INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAID, supra note 6, at 2 (discussing the mandatory 
populations states must cover to receive Medicaid funding). 
 29. See 42 U.S.C § 1396a(a)(10) (2012), amended by Substance Use–Disorder Prevention 
that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. 
No. 115-271, 132 Stat. 3894, 3902 (2018). 
 30. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: 
A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 301 (1996); see also SARA 
ROSENBAUM, COMMONWEALTH FUND, MEDICAID AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 4–5 (2018), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/Rosenbaum_Medicaid 
_and_the_Courts_v2.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAID AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS]. 
 31. See Mashaw, supra note 30, at 297–99, 299 n.6. 
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broad federal program inhibits the states from responding to 
specific, local needs.32 Here, the Medicaid block grant is advertised 
as an effective method to get the decision-making power “closer to 
the people,” which—in theory—will be more “visible” to a state’s 
populace; thus, the Medicaid program will be more responsive to 
the needs of Medicaid beneficiaries.33 
State freedom in both the policy-making and administration of 
a Medicaid block grant is likely more illusory than genuine.34 As an 
illustration of possible limitations on state policy-making and 
administration, the Community Development Block Grant,35 
though commonly identified as a success story,36 also demonstrates 
the multitude of conditions and sub-conditions that often 
accompany the receipt of a block grant, limiting the policy-making 
power of the state.37 These conditions and sub-conditions are often 
 
 32. See A BETTER WAY, supra note 1, at 25 (“Regrettably, in recent years the federal-
state balance has shifted since the passage of the Affordable Care Act, redefining 
federalism—where programs that should be administered locally are being overseen by 
political appointees and career bureaucrats in Washington issuing new rules 
and regulations.”). 
 33. See id. The interpretation of devolution further includes the following idea: 
[G]overnors and state legislatures are closer to patients in their states and know 
better than Washington bureaucrats where there are unmet needs and 
opportunities to cut down on waste, fraud, and abuse. All states should have more 
flexibility to adapt their Medicaid programs, to better design benefit packages in 
a way that better meets the needs of their state populations, promotes personal 
responsibility and healthy behaviors, and encourages a more holistic approach 
to care. 
Id. 
 34. See Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 30, at 306 (explaining that even if block grants 
met all their proposed goals, block grants would still “have a problematic relationship to 
devolution of political discretion from the central government to the states”). 
 35. See 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012). 
 36. See Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 30, at 306 n.27. 
 37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5321 (2012); Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 30, at 306. Mashaw 
and Calsyn specifically state: 
  In many ways, state discretion has been limited even within block grant 
funding formula. Techniques which have been used include the auditing of the 
grantee’s expenditures, requiring grantees to file plans for the use of the money, 
creation of “discretionary funds” for federal administrators to target development 
of a hybrid block-categorical grant which targets certain populations, or 
mandating public hearings on the use of the funds. Additional ways of limiting 
discretion include “pass through” requirements which specify that the grantee 
distribute the funds, or a portion of the funds, in certain prescribed proportions 
and “set asides” that simply prioritize within a block grant. 
Id. at 306 n.27. 
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described as a block grant’s “formula.”38 To illustrate, this specific 
block grant’s formula requires that the grantees institute a citizen 
participation plan,39 submit to an annual review and audit by the 
Secretary of Program Implementation,40 and have ready all 
necessary items for receipt by the Government Accountability 
Office for auditing purposes.41 The block grant also specifically 
identifies the activities to which grant funds may be allocated,42 the 
requirements on fund allocations,43 and the standards required of 
laborers and their wages.44 This block grant also requires 
guarantees of commitments from the state to assure grant resources 
are used for the acquisition of property;45 additionally, this block 
grant has remedial procedures for states who do not comply with 
the block grant’s requirements.46 If this supposedly ‘successful’ 
block grant is any indication of Medicaid’s future, states may not 
 
 38. See BLOCK GRANTS: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES, supra note 15, at 3 (“Federal 
administrators have a low degree of discretion over who receives block grants (after setting 
aside funding for administration and other specified activities, the remaining funds are 
typically allocated automatically to recipients by a formula or formulas specified 
in legislation) . . . .”). 
 39. See 42 U.S.C § 5304(a)(3) (2012). This section of the Community Development 
statute indicates that a grant will only be made when the citizen participation plan provides 
and encourages citizen participation (subsection A), timely access to local meetings 
(subsection B), information and records relating to proposed use of funds (subsection B), 
technical assistance to groups of low and moderate income who request such assistance 
(subsection C), public hearings (subsection D), the providing of written answers to 
complains and grievances within fifteen working days where possible (subsection E), and 
providing for the needs of non-English speaking citizens (subsection F), etc. Id. 
 40. See id. § 5304(e). 
 41. See id. § 5304(f). Recipients are required to provide: 
  Insofar as they relate to funds provided under this chapter, the financial 
transactions of recipients of such funds may be audited by the Government 
Accountability Office under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by 
the Comptroller General of the United States. The representatives of the 
Government Accountability Office shall have access to all books, accounts, 
records, reports, files, and other papers, things, or property belonging to or in use 
by such recipients pertaining to such financial transactions and necessary to 
facilitate the audit. 
Id. 
 42. See id. § 5305. 
 43. See id. § 5306. 
 44. See id. § 5310. 
 45. See id. § 5308. 
 46. See id. § 5311. 
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only expect similar confining conditions, but also restrictions on the 
freedom of states to craft their own policies.47 
Aside from possible policy limitations, the intrinsic nature of 
the block grant funding will impede state freedom with the 
constraints of medical inflation outpacing annual block grant 
growth; consequently, states will almost certainly have to make 
drastic cuts to beneficiary benefits and populations.48 As previously 
discussed, the nature of a block grant is designed to provide less 
federal funding over the course of time.49 This is done by finding a 
state’s spending in a particular year, capping that amount for an 
extended period of time, and only adjusting the capped figure over 
the course of time for general inflation.50 This approach is 
problematic as the specific inflation rate for healthcare has, at times, 
outpaced general inflation;51 additionally, the standard increase for 
only general inflation simultaneously leaves no room for changing 
program needs due to recessions, epidemics, disasters, etc.52 As the 
 
 47. See Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE L.J. F. 1, 24 (2017) 
(“Proposals to transform Medicaid into a block-grant program may trade on the rhetoric of 
states’ rights, but they have the perverse effect of inhibiting state power.”). 
 48. See MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT WOULD SLASH FEDERAL FUNDING, supra note 14, at 1. 
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has predicted the following consequences of a 
Medicaid block grant: 
  A Medicaid block grant would institute deeps cuts to federal funding for state 
Medicaid programs and threaten benefits for tens of millions of low-income 
families, senior citizens, and people with disabilities. To compensate for these 
severe funding cuts, states would likely have no choice but to institute draconian 
cuts to eligibility, benefits, and provider payments. 
Id. 
 49. See supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text. 
 50. See MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT WOULD SLASH FEDERAL FUNDING, supra note 14, at 2. 
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has suggested that this structure of the block 
grant is certain: 
Because a Medicaid block grant is explicitly intended to produce significant 
federal budgetary savings, block grants are designed in ways that give states 
considerably less federal funding each year than they would receive under the 
current financing system. That is typically accomplished by basing a state’s initial 
block grant amount on its current or historical spending and then increasing it 
annually at a considerable slower rate—such as general inflation—than the 
currently projected annual growth in federal Medicaid spending. The resulting 
federal funding cuts would thus grow steadily larger each year. 
Id. 
 51. See Bloomberg, Healthcare Prices to Outpace Inflation for the First Time Since 2010, 
FORTUNE (Feb. 15, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/02/15/healthcare-prices/. 
 52. See IMPLICATIONS OF A FEDERAL BLOCK GRANT FOR MEDICAID, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
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Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant 
analogously illustrates: from 1996 to 2016, the value of the block 
grant, capped and not adjusted for inflation, diminished in value 
by nearly a third.53 Despite the federal government’s creation of a 
TANF emergency fund during the Great Recession to assist cash-
strapped states, at least forty-six states responded to the recession 
by instituting cuts in social services and cash assistance.54 Such cuts 
are currently unrestored.55 
Most importantly, Medicaid already promotes state freedom —
a freedom unfettered by cuts to enrollment or benefits.56 Current 
Medicaid policies already allow states significant freedom to 
expand enrollment, such as covering additional populations like 
the ACA Medicaid-expansion group, or to provide additional 
benefits such as dental and vision care.57 Consequently, nearly 60% 
of Medicaid spending consists of optional spending not required 
by federal law.58 States are also free to set reimbursement rates 
 
 53. See ELIZABETH LOWER-BASCH, CLASP, TANF BLOCK GRANT 4 (2016), http://www. 
clasp.org/resources-and-publications/publication-1/TANF-101-Block-Grant.pdf [herein-
after TANF BLOCK GRANT] (“Under the 1996 law, the basic TANF block grant was fixed at 
$16.57 billion a year. This figure has not been increased to reflect inflation since TANF was 
first created. This, the value of the block grant has been eroded by 33 percent.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. (“During the Great Recession, increased demands for assistance and 
expanded federal support were counterbalanced by strained state budgets . . . . Total 
spending on child care assistance is at a 12-year low.”). 
 56. See HANNAH KATCH, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATES ARE USING 
FLEXIBILITY TO CREATE SUCCESSFUL, INNOVATIVE MEDICAID PROGRAMS 1 (2016), http:// 
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/6-13-16health.pdf. The Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities suggests that Medicaid is sufficiently flexible, stating: 
  State Medicaid programs across the country are tailoring services and models 
of care to local needs in ways that streamline health care delivery and improve 
health. These innovative models demonstrate that current Medicaid rules allow 
states significant flexibility, and disprove claims by proponents of block-granting 
Medicaid or imposing a per capita cap, as the House Republican budget plan 
would do, that current Medicaid rules inhibit state reforms. 
Id. 
 57. See MEDICAID AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS, supra note 30, at 2 (discussing the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ role in making the ACA’s Medicaid expansion optional); 
JANUARY ANGELES, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, RYAN MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT 
WOULD CAUSE SEVERE REDUCTIONS IN HEALTH CARE AND LONG-TERM CARE FOR SENIORS, 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, AND CHILDREN 3 (2011), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default 
/files/atoms/files/5-3-11health.pdf [hereinafter RYAN MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT WOULD 
CAUSE SEVERE REDUCTIONS IN HEALTH CARE]. 
 58. See RYAN MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT WOULD CAUSE SEVERE REDUCTIONS IN HEALTH 
CARE, supra note 57, at 3–4 (citation omitted). 
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for providers and to implement cost-saving, managed-care plans 
for Medicaid beneficiaries.59 These examples, among others, 
suggest that the expanded freedom touted by Medicaid block 
grant proponents is likely rhetorical. Any liberating effect created 
by a block grant will be offset by unacceptable reductions both in 
state autonomy and in benefits received by the benefi-
ciaries themselves.60 
B. Medicaid Effectiveness 
Medicaid block granting proponents look to President Reagan’s 
implementation of block grants—including his desire to block 
grant Medicaid—along with a long line of other conservative 
leaders to justify block granting Medicaid.61 An underlying motive 
of these leaders in proposing such a change is the belief that the 
Medicaid program is outgrowing its ability to be effective.62 But the 
Medicaid block grant proponents’ comparisons to successful block 
grants and the acknowledgement of past intent both ignore crucial 
distinctions between developmental and redistributive policy.63 
The new freedom given to the states from block grants will not 
enhance as much as it will erode the effectiveness of the Medicaid 
 
 59. See id. at 4; KATCH, supra note 56, at 1. 
 60. See Bagley, supra note 47, at 24. 
 61. See A BETTER WAY, supra note 1, at 25. 
 62. See Lambrew, supra note 1, at 42–43. Lambrew provided historical context, stating: 
Since its beginning, the United States has struggled to balance nation and state 
responsibilities. From President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s 
through President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society in the 1960s, the proponents 
of a common, national interest prevailed. . . . Then Ronald Reagan changed this 
trend, bringing back the idea of states’ taking responsibility for welfare programs. 
His rationale was that the states are more likely to be efficient and innovative 
because they are both closer to the people and held more accountable by 
them . . . .” 
Id. 
 63. See Paul E. Peterson, Devolution’s Price, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 112–13 (1996) 
(“For the same reason that local governments are well-suited to providing economic 
development—the mobility of labor and capital—they are not effective at 
redistributing wealth.”). 
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program as a safety net for the poor, thereby contributing to a 
decline in the benefits available to beneficiaries.64 
Historically, according to Professor Paul Peterson, “states and 
localities have assumed primary responsibility for managing the 
physical and social infrastructure—roads, education, mass-transit 
systems, public parks, police and fire services, and sanitation 
systems—necessary for the country’s economic growth.”65 These 
developmental policies are best suited for and most effective at the 
local level because they involve concerns of local residents and 
businesses.66 Redistributive policy, on the other hand, involves the 
shifting of resources from one group to another group in need of 
such resources (e.g., single parents, the disabled, the elderly, the 
unemployed, the sick, the poor, etc.) and is most effectively 
implemented by the expansive reach of a national government.67 
 
 64. See EDWIN PARK & JUDITH SOLOMON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, PER 
CAPITA CAPS OR BLOCK GRANTS WOULD LEAD TO LARGE AND GROWING CUTS IN STATE 
MEDICAID PROGRAMS 3 (2016), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/6-22 
-16health.pdf [hereinafter BLOCK GRANTS] (“The flexibility apparently would eliminate 
various federal beneficiary protections and key federal minimum standards related to who 
may qualify for Medicaid and which essential health services the program must cover.”). 
 65. See Peterson, supra note 63, at 112. 
 66. See id. at 112–13. 
 67. See id. at 113 (“The smaller the territorial reach of a local government, the less its 
capacity for redistribution.”). There is evidence, however, that suggests that second-order 
devolution (or the process whereby a state further devolves their welfare authority to local 
level governments) has an led to a higher number of people transitioning off of welfare. See 
Byungkyu Kim & Richard C. Fording, Second-Order Devolution and the Implementation of TANF 
in the U.S. States, 10 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 341 (Winter 2010). The study’s authors specifically 
found that “[a]fter controlling for several socioeconomic and political variables, we find that 
TANF programs in [second-order devolution] states display significantly better employment 
outcomes for two of our three measures of performance: employment exists and average earning 
gain.” Id. at 361. Other research has found that the professionalism of those implementing a 
devolved welfare program along with the perceptions of empowerment the local imple-
mentation networks received led to effective welfare program implementation. See Chung-
Lae Cho et al., Translating National Policy Objectives into Local Achievements Across Planes of 
Governance and Among Multiple Actors: Second-Order Devolution and Welfare Reform 
Implementation, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 31, 49 (2005); see also Michael Craw, Caught 
at the Bottom? Redistribution and Local Government in an Era of Devolution, 47 ST. & LOC. GOV’T 
REV. 68, 73 (2015) (“The implication of this is that local responses to poverty are not uniformly 
antiredistributive, but rather are conditional on the degree to which taxable wealth is mobile 
and communities are fiscally independent. Local governments have greater autonomy in the 
social welfare realm when exit costs are higher or when they do not need to rely on local 
taxes to fund services. Given the influence of fiscal federalism over public finance, it is easy 
to overlook the significant amount of the provision and financing of social welfare functions 
that happens at the local level.”). 
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These principles have been understood in the past; for example, 
President Reagan’s block grant implementations focused on 
developmental programs such as community development and 
education and left redistributive programs such as food stamps, 
welfare, and Medicaid nearly untouched.68 
Today’s Medicaid block granting proponents are clearly 
missing the fundamental distinction between developmental and 
redistributive policy.69 In a redistributive program, to qualify for 
Medicaid, states must meet certain requirements to receive federal 
funding.70 These federal standards exist to effect the fundamental 
purpose of the redistributive policy of providing a safety net for the 
poor.71 With the purpose of redistributive policy understood, 
requirements on states to cover certain mandatory populations, 
such as children up to age nineteen whose family’s income is at or 
below 133% of the federal poverty line,72 are reasonable because 
they effect the baseline scope of the redistributive program.73 It also 
 
 68. See Peterson, supra note 63, at 115 (“Most importantly, Reagan cuts focused not on 
the safety net but on traditional public services. . . . At the same time, welfare, food stamps, 
and Medicaid policies were left virtually untouched. Overall, redistributive grants actually 
increased from 1.3% to 1.4% of GNP.”); see also Lambrew, supra note 1, at 45 (“In explaining 
why Medicare was not included in Reagan’s attempts to limit the federal government, an 
official described Medicare as one of the ‘sacred’ programs.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 69. See Peterson, supra note 63, at 112–13. Peterson makes an important policy 
distinction, clarifying: 
  The reluctance of state and local governments to participate in the 
redistributive movement can hardly be attributed to the political climate. Over 
most of this period Democrats controlled at least part of state government in most 
states, and they held unified control in several. Differences in state and local 
treatment of development and redistributive policies are rooted not in partisan 
politics but in underlying features of the federal system. 
Id. 
 70. See Jon Donenberg, Medicaid and Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining State 
Compliance with Federal Availability Requirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 1501 (2008) (“When states 
agree to participate in Medicaid, they must provide assurances that they will act ‘in 
conformity with the specific requirements’ of the federal Medicaid statute and applicable 
CMS regulations.” (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2007))). 
 71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2012); Donenberg, supra note 70 at 1505 (“Medicaid uses 
both promise of federal funds and the threat of funding withdrawal to shape the coverage 
provided by individual states. By reducing the costs to states to provide particular services, 
federal matching funds facilitate new initiatives and coverage expansions.”). 
 72. See NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, THE BASICS: MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS 2 
(2016), https://www.nhpf.org/library/the-basics/Basics_Medicaid_01-05-16.pdf [hereinafter 
THE BASICS: MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS]. 
 73. Interestingly, states have a great deal of discretion in the manner in which they 
conduct their Medicaid programs’ scope and structure. See Saundra K. Schneider, 
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makes sense out of the numerous other program requirements, 
such as the inclusion of mandatory benefits—hospitalization, 
physician visits, nursing home care, preventive care, screenings, 
testing, etc.74—as these are the requirements that effect the depth of 
the redistributive program.75 States are forbidden from requiring 
anything but very low copayments of the beneficiaries for any of 
these services because such requirements are logically inconsistent 
with the need for a redistribution program.76 
As states already have significant freedom in how they manage 
and provide for their Medicaid programs—even while adhering to 
the mandatory federal standards—the only real effectiveness that 
block grant flexibility might generate would likely be reforms that 
currently violate federal law.77 Professor Stephen D. Sugarman 
suggested that these types of changes could come in two forms: (1) 
changes that are currently unconstitutional and (2) changes which 
might be constitutional but that states cannot currently obtain 
waivers from the federal government to implement.78 
One example of an unconstitutional change would be a state’s 
implementation of a two-tiered welfare system, with a beneficiary’s 
 
Intergovernmental Influences on Medicaid Program Expenditures, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 756, 757 
(1988). According to Schneider, states decide exactly who is eligible for Medicaid services, as 
states establish the eligibility standards for the federally mandated beneficiaries as well as 
decide whether to include optional populations. Id. 
 74. See THE BASICS: MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS, supra note 72, at 4–5. 
 75. See C. David Flower, State Discretion in Funding Organ Transplants Under the 
Medicaid Program: Interpretive Guidelines in Determining the Scope of Mandated Coverage, 79 
MINN. L. REV. 1233 (1995) (highlighting the fact that the line is not clear as to what services 
are required to be covered by a state’s Medicaid program beyond the statutorily mandated 
coverage); see also Schneider, supra note 73, at 757. Schneider also indicates that states can 
influence the structure (or depth) of their Medicaid program by indicating what optional 
services to provide (in addition to the federally mandated benefits) to its beneficiaries as well 
as their placement of “restrictions on the number, type, and mix of services that are covered.” 
Id. States also decide how providers are reimbursed which includes defining “what are 
considered ‘reasonable,’ ‘customary,’ or ‘allowable’ charges.” Id. Lastly, states decide who 
will implement the policy by deciding whether it will be administered at the state of local 
level. Id. 
 76. See THE BASICS: MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS, supra note 72, at 5–6. 
 77. See Sugarman, supra note 23, at 144–46. 
 78. See id. at 145 (“Therefore, in principle, the key objective that the block grant 
solution would accomplish would be to allow states to enact changes for which they cannot 
currently obtain waivers.”). 
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tier placement determined by their time of residency.79 Such a 
design would surely have as its intent to discourage welfare 
recipients from moving into the state, thereby promoting program 
effectiveness by rationing resources. The Supreme Court held in 
Shapiro v. Thompson that a waiting period for newcomers of a state 
to receive welfare benefits was unconstitutional80 and would likely 
hold similarly in other situations, such as our example.81 These 
types of attempts to promote program effectiveness rub against 
core constitutional protections, making them difficult to implement 
under an entitlement or block grant program.82 
The second form of changes are those that are constitutional but 
for which a state cannot obtain a waiver under an entitlement pro-
gram; these are the type of reforms that a block grant might allow. 
The history of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) entitlement program, and its transformation into the TANF 
block grant, provides an excellent example of the “effective” changes 
allowed within this program with the new state flexibility.83 
As a federal entitlement, a state’s AFDC program would have 
needed a waiver to depart from the federal guidelines. The reforms 
that a state would have a difficult time obtaining a waiver for are 
illustrated from the examples of AFDC waiver requests that were 
 
 79. See id. (“A good example is the strategy of high-benefit states to offer newcomers 
to the state lower welfare benefits than are paid to old timers.”). 
 80. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969). 
 81. See Sugarman, supra note 23, at 145. Regarding this point, Sugarman cautioned: 
Nonetheless, the Bush Administration allowed Wisconsin to try it out on the 
ground that state officials should have the right to make a pitch to the current U.S. 
Supreme Court to abandon or limit Shapiro. The Clinton Administration, however, 
has refused to grant a waiver for this two-tier benefit strategy, and by the same 
token would also refuse to grant waivers for other experiments containing 
conditions that it considers to be unconstitutional under prevailing doctrine. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) 
 82. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631. The U.S. Supreme Court stated the following: 
  Thus, the purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as 
justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting period, since that 
purpose is constitutionally impermissible. If a law has “no other purpose . . . than 
to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to 
exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)). 
 83. See LIZ SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, WHY TANF IS NOT A MODEL 
FOR OTHER SAFETY NET PROGRAMS 1–7 (2016), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files 
/atoms/files/6-6-16tanf.pdf. 
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ultimately rejected by the Clinton Administration.84 The proposals 
received by the Clinton Administration included: 
(1) a complete separation from welfare after a maximum period 
(as contrasted with required public service work in lieu of a cash 
grant at such time); (2) submission to random drug testing as a 
condition of receiving welfare; and (3) strict sanctions in the form 
of immediate exclusion from welfare for non-cooperative 
behavior that now leads initially only to mild punishments.85 
Such proposals might have had as their advertised and 
intended objectives an increased effectiveness by promoting 
incentives to become self-sufficient, rationing resources for the 
most deserving, or using discretion to allot resources to those who 
express appreciation through program obedience; however, under 
the redistributive terms of the federal entitlement, these requests 
were deemed outside the scope of the program’s purpose, allowing 
the federal government to reject such proposals.86 
The transfer of the AFDC entitlement to the TANF block grant 
came in the shadow of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.87 This welfare reform act 
facilitated an ideological transition driven by the idea that welfare 
recipients now had to do something to get something, essentially 
 
 84. See Sugarman, supra note 23, at 145 (“A second group of changes that states might 
like to make, but for which they cannot . . . are those that the federal government will not 
now permit because, while the changes may be constitutional, nonetheless they are too 
inconsistent with the fundamental underlying purposes of the AFDC program.”). 
 85. Id. at 145–46. 
 86. See id. at 139. Professor Sugarman believes that their advertised intentions were 
not their real intentions, explaining: 
[N]ot long ago the major failings of AFDC were seen by many in Washington to 
lie in inadequate benefits and demeaning administration. In view of our 
experience with other income transfer programs, the desirable direction of reform 
to solve those failings would be to enhance federal responsibility through the 
creation of a generous national benefit level managed by the social security 
administration. But that strategy assumed not only public empathy with these 
single parent families but also a willingness to enable the mothers in those families 
to care for their children without entering the paid labor force if they chose not to 
do so—exactly the way we now treat most widowed mothers, and have been 
treating them through social security since 1939. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 87. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); see, e.g., Christine N. Cimini, The New Contract: Welfare 
Reform, Devolution, and Due Process, 61 MD. L. REV. 246, 246 (2002). 
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redefining the purpose of the redistributive program.88 The TANF 
statute states as its purpose the providing of resources for children 
to be raised in their homes; however, it also departed from being an 
exclusive redistributive program by encouraging the elimination of 
parental dependence on government benefits by promoting job 
preparation, work, and marriage.89 The statute also seeks to prevent 
and reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies while also encouraging the 
formation and maintenance of two-parent families.90 
The TANF program requires a recipient to be engaged in work 
(as defined by the state) within twenty-four months of receipt of 
assistance,91 and to enter into an agreement with the government 
through an individual responsibility plan.92 The TANF program 
also mandates a sixty-month cap on the receipt of benefits, with few 
exceptions.93 The statute adds other requirements in furtherance of 
its objective that welfare recipients to do something to get 
something, including: job-search obligations, school-attendance 
 
 88. See Cimini, supra note 87, at 257 (“In the legislative hearings leading to the passage 
of the Welfare Reform Act, numerous legislators articulated their desire to change the 
existing entitlement model of welfare, under which recipients were perceived as getting 
something for nothing.”). 
 89. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1)–(4) (2012). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 92. See id. § 608(b)(2)(A). The specific requirements of the individual responsibility 
plans include the following subsections: 
(i) sets forth an employment goal for the individual and a plan for moving the 
individual immediately into private sector employment; 
(ii) sets forth the obligations of the individual, which may include a requirement 
that the individual attend school, maintain certain grades and attendance, keep 
school age children of the individual in school, immunize children, attend 
parenting and money management classes, or do other things that will help the 
individual become and remain employed in the private sector; 
(iii) to the greatest extent possible is designed to move the individual into 
whatever private sector employment the individual is capable of handling as 
quickly as possible, and to increase the responsibility and amount of work the 
individual is to handle over time; 
(iv) describes the services the State will provide the individual so that the 
individual will be able to obtain and keep employment in the private sector, and 
describe the job counseling and other services that will be provided by the State; 
and 
(v) may require the individual to undergo appropriate substance abuse treatment. 
Id. § 608(b)(2)(A)(i)–(v). 
 93. See id. § 608(a)(7)(A)–(C). 
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goals for children, agreements to become self-sufficient, etc.94 The 
individual responsibility plans vary by state, with some states 
having further devolved authority over these programs to local 
governments.95 Consequently, these plans often suffer for a want of 
written rules,96 with discrepancies in criteria and differing 
standards of enrollment common even within the same state.97 
Social workers, who previously only had a programmatic role for 
determining the criteria under the federal entitlement, now have 
broad authority to determine those eligible for the program.98 
As the history of the TANF block grant illustrates, without 
federal entitlement protection, “effectiveness” can begin to 
encompass a variety of initiatives that are unrelated to redistri-
butive policy. A similar ideological transition of purpose within the 
Medicaid program would be devastating for those dependent on 
its medical funding, making a Medicaid block grant a dangerous 
option for those who need it most.99 
 
 94. See Cimini, supra note 87, at 258 n.69. 
 95. See id. at 256. 
 96. See id. at 260 (“Actual implementation of the Welfare Reform Act has led to an 
increased absence of rules. In the administration of welfare programs, caseworkers now rely 
on guidelines that offer a range of options, as opposed to bright-line rules.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 97. See id. at 262–64. 
 98. See id. at 261 (“As compared to caseworkers under the AFDC system, who were 
mainly eligibility technicians, caseworkers are now asked to be vocational experts, child care 
specialists, and even mental health workers in order to assess and arbitrate the terms of an 
applicant’s public benefits.” (footnote omitted)). But see Juliet F. Gainsborough, To Devolve or 
Not Devolve? Welfare Reform in the States, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 603, 617 (2003) (the author, after 
examining the devolution of TANF programs in the states, found that states that devolved 
welfare programs to the local level occurred only in states that already had locally 
administered programs). The author also stated: “The importance of the previous policy and 
its mobilization of local interests around welfare reform is illustrated by the lack of 
devolution that occurred in states without this history of local involvement in 
welfare policy.” Id. 
 99. See Cimini, supra note 87 at 260. Cimini highlights four factors that lead to 
increased discretion in a welfare program, three of which are visible in the TANF block grant, 
and would be equally visible in a Medicaid block-grant program, stating: 
  Scholars have identified a number of factors that lead to increased discretion 
and have found these factors to exist across the range of welfare administrative 
models. The factors include: an increased absence of actual rules to guide 
discretion, a change in the role of the welfare administrator from eligibility 
technician to contract negotiator, devolution of authority to state and local 
governments, and the privatization of previously public services. 
Id. 
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Medicaid block granting opponents have already warned of the 
potential changes that might follow from implementing a Medicaid 
block grant, including: shifting beneficiaries into individual-market 
plans without assurances that the coverage would be adequate and 
affordable100 or states establishing a work requirement to qualify 
for coverage (terminating coverage for those found to be noncom-
pliant).101 Additionally, states could charge premiums for most 
adults, use waiting lists or cap enrollment, and restrict or eliminate 
benefits now protected under federal law.102 States would also be 
able to charge larger co-payments to beneficiaries and omit cover-
age of current mandatory services.103 These proposed structural 
changes, similar in nature to the implemented TANF reforms, 
suggest an underlying ideological transition as well; this transition 
defeats both the historical and current statutory purpose of 
Medicaid—that of a redistributive welfare program providing a 
safety net for the poor.104 
Because the purpose of providing state flexibility to increase 
state Medicaid effectiveness is incompatible with Medicaid’s 
purpose of being a safety net for the poor, the purpose of state 
flexibility is likely driven by other motives.105 As the block grant 
will eventually succumb to the rate of medical inflation, states will 
undoubtedly be forced to make many of the above concessions, 
using their flexibility to effectuate cuts to Medicaid recipients and 
benefits; consequently, the effectiveness of Medicaid will be limited 
 
 100. See BLOCK GRANTS, supra note 64, at 3–4. Specifically, under the Better Way or 
House Republican plan, insurers could eliminate benefits such as maternity care, 
prescription coverage, impose substantial deductibles, annual benefit limits, or other cost-
sharing requirements. Id. Interestingly, with Congress’ failure to repeal the ACA, many of 
these proposed changes are appearing as Section 1115 Waivers whereby a state can ask 
permission to implement a component of their Medicaid program that is outside of federal 
regulations. See MARYBETH MUSUMECI ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., SECTION 1115 MEDICAID 
DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS: THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF APPROVED AND PENDING 
WAIVERS 3–6 (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Section-1115-Medicaid-De 
monstration-Waivers-The-Current-Landscape-of-Approved-and-Pending-Waivers. 
 101. See BLOCK GRANTS, supra note 64, at 4. Under the House Republican plan, states 
would be allowed to require the “able bodied adults” who are beneficiaries of Medicaid to 
show that they are looking for work, working, or in some other educational or 
training program. Id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2012); Sugarman, supra note 23, at 144–46. 
 105. See MEDICAID IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 20, at 1. 
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by inhibiting the breadth, scope, and depth of coverage available to 
beneficiaries—thereby exposing the medically vulnerable to 
unnecessary risks by undermining their programmatic rights. 
C. State Innovation 
Medicaid block grant proponents argue that state flexibility 
leads to innovation, which is at the heart of our federal system of 
government.106 The policy behind this theory is that national 
programs, such as Medicaid, promote a uniform system that causes 
states to miss out on the opportunity to approach their program 
differently; consequently, this deprives the states of the oppor-
tunity to observe and implement other, possibly better, 
approaches.107 Implicit in this idea is the prospect of states sharing 
information, leading to a state’s abandoning of a particular 
approach in favor of a more efficient approach, with all states 
eventually coming to a national consensus that benefits the entirety 
of the system.108 
Medicaid block grant proponents argue that different locations 
have different tastes and concerns, and the block grant would allow 
innovative tailoring to those concerns without the excesses of a 
national program.109 With the control closer to the people, they 
 
 106. See A BETTER WAY, supra note 1, at 21 (“States have long been America’s innovation 
hubs. One key to long-term market stability is giving states the flexibility to craft premium-
reduction programs that support wellness and offer innovative plan designs.”). 
 107. See Sugarman, supra note 23, at 140. Professor Sugarman has suggested 
the following: 
The argument here is that the national government too quickly imposes a uniform 
system, and so we lose the opportunity to learn from a diversity of approaches to 
a problem that individual states are likely to take (even though, of course, the 
federal government could itself deliberately engage in direct sponsorship of 
experimental solutions). 
Id. 
 108. See id. (“The notion seems to be that once some states do experiment, others will 
observe the results and embrace the best solution for themselves. Hence, over time, one 
would expect a convergence on policies that prove successful.”). 
 109. See id. (“Federalism is also often praised for providing variety in government, 
thereby giving people with different tastes reason to live in one locale or another—although 
this idea is traditionally more frequently applied to local variation, not so much to state-to-
state variation.”). 
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could theoretically block their local leaders from implementing 
changes they find unacceptable within such programs.110 
Despite the promising potential, history has shown an absence 
of a direct correlation between the virtues of federalism and a 
tailored implementation of a social program.111 For example, 
unemployment compensation, as a form of social insurance, is 
administered at the state level.112 States differ in many respects as 
to both the scope and criteria to qualify for such benefits (e.g., some 
states allow employees to quit jobs because of a fear of future health 
consequences, others do not, etc.).113 While such differences can be 
understood as experiments of federalism, they are more likely 
responses to the local business climate of the state.114 This 
conclusion is supported further by the omission of any evidence 
that other states have actively sought out a best solution to model 
their unemployment compensation programs after (based on the 
successes of other states) or evidence that one approach has led to 
a national consensus on how to implement unemployment 
compensation.115 It is hard to imagine that a Medicaid block grant 
would be an exception to history. 
 
 110. See id. at 141 (“The idea here is that the closer government is to the people, the 
better able the people are to block their leaders from doing things that the citizenry doesn’t 
really want, especially through tighter local control over government revenues (i.e., taxes).”). 
 111. See id. at 142. Professor Sugarman cautions: 
In short, I do not read the record on state-run social insurance schemes as one that 
has either: (a) enabled states to experiment boldly and to act decisively based on 
the results of each other’s experiments; or (b) permitted states to capture in their 
plans important cultural or value differences that may exist from state to state. 
Id. 
 112. See id. at 141. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. (“There are differences, to be sure; differences that federalism permits, even 
encourages. But they do not seem properly understood as experiments or innovations. It is 
not as though states have mounted serious research efforts to decide which of these various 
paired solutions are somehow to be judged best and then conformed.”). 
 115. See id. at 142 (“But, once again, the states simply do not seem to treat these diverse 
approaches as experiments that, after a suitable period of time and study, lead all, or most of 
them, to agree that one solution is best.”). While causation is difficult to establish, correlation 
amongst the states’ in the implementation of their welfare programs is well established. See 
Robert C. Lieberman & Greg M. Shaw, Looking Inward, Looking Outward: The Politics of State 
Welfare Innovation under Devolution, 53 POL. RES. Q. 215, 235 (2000) (“[Our results] suggest 
that states moved together in response to national welfare trends, and that when they chose 
to innovate they tended to do similar things, regardless of ideological, partisan, or other local 
and regional factors that might have pushed them in divergent directions.”). Liberman and 
Shaw also found evidence of states’ convergence of AFDC reforms from evidence that states 
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Notably, Medicaid is already innovative in numerous ways.116 
States have, for the last several decades, implemented coordination 
techniques such as managed-care plans that encompass a network 
of providers.117 States have also implemented capitated-rate 
payments—eliminating the incentive to provide unnecessary 
services by providing the plan or provider a set amount per 
beneficiary—as opposed to pay-by-service plans.118 Such 
coordinated and capitated plans can provide for payments based 
on the quality of service, thereby succeeding in both reducing 
unnecessary services and focusing on the overall health of the 
beneficiary.119 States have also experimented with streamlining 
care for the most vulnerable of beneficiaries, helping them access 
timely care.120 
Specific examples of states using flexibility to innovate their 
Medicaid program include Missouri’s Health Homes initiative, 
under which care for beneficiaries with serious mental illness or 
 
would cluster reforms together into single waivers allowing states to incorporate other 
states’ reforms into their waiver requests and that states did “not seem to have behaved as if 
they were trying to differentiate themselves from each other.” Id. at 235. Research has found 
that states often realign themselves with national priorities in times of budgetary shortfalls. 
See Michael R. Sosin, Decentralization, Devolution, Financial Shortfalls, and State Priorities in 
Service Programs in the Early 2000s, 22 J. PUB. RES. & THEORY 701, 725 (2012). 
 116. See KATCH, supra note 56, at 1 (“Well before health reform expanded Medicaid 
coverage for millions of low-income adults, states began changing how they deliver 
Medicaid services to help ensure that beneficiaries receive appropriate, timely, and cost-
effective care.”). 
 117. See id. at 3 (“Many states now rely on managed care plans to develop networks of 
providers, ensure that beneficiaries have access to primary care providers, and help 
beneficiaries coordinate their care.”). 
 118. See id. Hannah Katch, from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, has stated 
the following as another example of state innovation: 
Rather than paying providers for each service, which may create an incentive to 
furnish unnecessary, costly services, states pay a capitated rate, where a plan or 
provider receives a set amount per beneficiary and is responsible for their care. If 
payments are set at sound levels, this method can encourage plans and providers 
to provide the appropriate level of services to keep people healthy while avoiding 
unnecessary services, which can otherwise drive up costs. 
Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. at 4 (“In addition to helping individuals navigate the various services they 
need, states are integrating the design of these services to streamline care for their most 
vulnerable beneficiaries. Providers are improving communication and data-sharing 
techniques to help beneficiaries access appropriate and timely care across multi-
ple systems.”). 
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chronic physical health conditions, treated in a home setting, has 
reduced the number of emergency room visits and preventable 
hospitalizations.121 The implementation of Health Homes in 
Missouri led to a monthly savings of $52 dollars per Medicaid 
participant.122 Similarly, Tennessee is one of many states that has 
implemented the Money Follows the Person program—aimed at 
transitioning Medicaid beneficiaries from nursing homes to their 
own home, the home of a caregiver, or a community residential 
facility.123 Tennessee estimates that it spends close to half, or $1,969 
of the $3,710 required to provide beneficiary nursing home 
accommodations, by transitioning the beneficiary to one of the 
alternative residences.124 
Approved Medicaid experimentation can also foster innova-
tion, as evidenced by Wisconsin’s receipt of a Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation (CCMI) grant, a program which assists 
children beneficiaries whose complex medical needs result in high 
medical costs.125 This coordinated service streamlines outpatient 
 
 121. See id. at 4 (“These services include comprehensive care management, care 
coordination, support transitioning between institutions or from an institution to the 
community, and referral to community and social services.”). 
 122. See id. at 5. 
 123. See id. Hannah Katch explained further the benefits of the Tennessee 
program, stating: 
  Many people in nursing facilities don’t need the level of care the facilities 
provide but can’t return to the community because they lack a home or the support 
they need to stay in their home. To address this problem, states are rebalancing 
Medicaid long-term services and supports away from institutional care in favor of 
home- and community-based services that help people return to or remain in a 
community setting. 
Id. 
 124. See id. at 5–6 (“Between October 2011 and June 2013, more than 620 beneficiaries 
transitioned to the community through the program. It has produced significant state 
savings by reducing unnecessary nursing facility stays.”). 
 125. See id. at 6. The specific incentives of this program include the following: 
  Health reform established the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
(CMMI) to test new health care payment and delivery models. One model offers a 
new way to provide care for children with complex medical needs, a rapidly 
growing group who tend to have very high health care costs and have hospital 
readmission rates equal to or higher than seniors who are Medicare beneficiaries. 
Community-based pediatricians often struggle to meet their needs, and these 
children and their families often must coordinate care from many different 
providers—especially when their hospital care is entirely separate from care 
available in their community. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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care and coordination, having resulted in both inpatient-hospital 
days and costs decreasing by 50%.126 Further successful experimen-
tation can be found in Oregon’s accountable-care organizations.127 
Established through a Medicaid Section 1115 waiver, these 
accountable-care organizations coordinate medical needs as well as 
social needs (such as finding housing) by working with community 
organizations to meet the needs of Medicaid beneficiaries.128 
Oregon’s largest accountable-care organization, Health Share, 
achieved in its first operational year an 18% reduction in emergency 
room visits.129 Further, it found 80% of its members successfully 
enrolled in a specified medical home, and it earned 100% of its 
conditional quality-measurement payments were earned from the 
federal government.130 
These examples of successful local tailoring highlight the fact 
that federalism is already at work within Medicaid. Medical needs 
are not so drastically different across the states to justify the shift in 
power Medicaid block grant proponents suggest is needed. In fact, 
implementation of a block grant would significantly impede much 
of the progress that states have made in providing streamlined and 
innovative Medicaid services to beneficiaries without compro-
mising their programmatic rights. By implementing a Medicaid 
block grant, states would be forced to make substantive cuts as 
opposed to continuing efforts to innovate the delivery of Medicaid 
to beneficiaries.131 
 
 126. See id. (“Evaluation of this and similar models shows that participants are 
significantly more likely to report that their children’s health needs were being met, and 
children were more likely to attend primary care checkups and receive scheduled therapies, 
mental health care, and respite care.”). 
 127. See id. at 6–7. 
 128. See id. at 7 (“Oregon established a network of ACOs using a broad federal waiver 
(known as a section 1115 demonstration) that allows the Department of Health and Human 
Services to waive statutory requirements to permit testing of innovative state or local models 
or programs.”). 
 129. See id. at 7–8. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See MEDICAID IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 20. 
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II. PROMOTION OF STATE FISCAL PRUDENCE 
Medicaid is the third largest domestic program in the federal 
budget,132 and has grown significantly under the Affordable Care 
Act, covering nearly seventy-four million people in 2017.133 As 
previously mentioned, the federal government picks up, on 
average, 57% to 60% of the states’ costs.134 With other groups, such 
as the ACA expansion population, the federal government will pay 
90% of states’ costs after 2020.135 Ideas that this level of spending is 
unsustainable are not unfounded, as federalism scholar Robert 
Greenstein has said: 
We face, as a nation, severe, long-term fiscal problems. We face a 
collision between rising costs for elderly entitlements and a 
shrinking revenue base. . . . Over time, some things, many things 
have to give. And I think block grants are attractive to some policy 
makers, as a way over a long period of time to squeeze funding 
for some of the big low-income programs, relative to what it 
would be under the current entitlement funding structures and it 
enables it to do it without looking heartless by proposing to throw 
x-numbers of people over the side in program A, B, or C.136 
Proponents of Medicaid block grants surely believe that cuts 
need to be made, with block granting being a solution.137 The House 
Republican plan for the fiscal year 2017 would have saved the 
federal government one trillion dollars over ten years by imple-
menting a Medicaid block grant, relative to current law.138 
 
 132. See MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 1. 
 133. See MEDICAID IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 20; see also INTRODUCTION TO 
MEDICAID, supra note 6, at 1 (“In any given month, Medicaid served 33 million children, 27 
million adults (mostly in low-income working families), 6 million seniors, and 10 million 
persons with disabilities, according to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates.”). 
 134. See INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAID, supra note 6, at 4. 
 135. See MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 2. 
 136. See BLOCK GRANTS: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES, supra note 15, at 8 
(citation omitted). 
 137. See Edwin Park, Report: State Medicaid Enrollment Cuts Would Be Steep Under House 
Bill, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (June 19, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.cbpp.org 
/blog/report-state-medicaid-enrollment-cuts-would-be-steep-under-house-bill. 
 138. See MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT WOULD SLASH FEDERAL FUNDING, supra note 14, at 2–
3 (“Moreover, the actual cut in federal funding for states, relative to current law, would be 
even greater in years when either enrollment or per-beneficiary health care costs rose faster 
than expected.”). 
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Medicaid block grant proponents argue that block granting 
funding will promote long-term planning, eliminate unnecessary 
and wasteful duplication among other programs, and eliminate 
uncontrollable spending.139 While these are the right objectives, 
they are not best satisfied by implementing a block grant due to the 
current state economic benefits received from Medicaid, state 
constraints on securing additional funding for social programs, and 
the implementation of a better approach that may reduce down-
stream costs and produce immediate economic benefits by 
expanding, versus contracting, coverage. This Part will conclude 
that the benefits of providing early Medicaid treatment to a larger 
population will best promote effective long-term planning, the 
streamlining of program (or treatment) objectives, and most 
effectively eliminate uncontrollable spending. 
A. Medicaid Block Grant Impact on State Budgets 
While Medicaid is a significant spending item on a state budget, 
it is also the largest source of federal revenue for states, accounting 
for more than half of all federal funds for 2015.140 Medicaid is 
responsible for one of every six dollars spent on healthcare 
nationwide.141 The insertion of federal money into the state 
economy has a multiplier effect, not only paying the services of 
providers, but indirectly benefiting community businesses and 
industries.142 Illustrating this idea, Medicaid spending for 2009 
accounted for the following national averages: 16% of all total 
health services and supplies, 18% of hospital care, 8% of profes-
sional services, 33% of nursing home care, and 8% of prescription 
drug spending.143 Equally as important, many public hospitals, 
children’s hospitals, and rural community health centers depend 
on Medicaid revenue, including Medicaid Disproportionate Share 
 
 139. See BLOCK GRANTS: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 140. See MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 8 (“In FY 2015, Medicaid 
accounted for 28.2 percent of total state spending for all items in the state budget, but 18.7 
percent of all state general fund spending, a far second to spending on K–12 education 
(35.6 percent of state general fund spending).”). 
 141. See id. at 1. 
 142. See id. at 8. 
 143. See IMPLICATIONS OF A FEDERAL BLOCK GRANT FOR MEDICAID, supra note 6, at 
5 fig.7. 
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Hospital payments, which allow the hospitals to serve a large 
amount of low-income patients.144 
As block granting Medicaid would not only limit the total 
number of beneficiaries but would also have economic 
repercussions in states, expanding Medicaid should be favored in 
an effort to promote the current multiplier effects from Medicaid’s 
federal funding. 
B. State Restrictions 
Opponents of Medicaid block granting also point to two 
restrictions on states’ ability to make up shortfalls in federal 
funding. These restrictions—when combined with block grant 
deficits—practically guarantee future cuts to enrollment and 
benefits and would most likely result in a state’s inability to 
implement programs of equivalent entitlement quality.145  
The first state restriction is what is referred to as the 
“Countercyclical Trap.”146 This occurs when, for example, a 
recession hits, resulting in many people losing their employer-
sponsored insurance, which requires them to enroll in programs 
like Medicaid.147 This results in larger federal outlays while, 
simultaneously, the economic recession lowers tax revenues.148 In 
these types of situations, most state governments are not allowed 
to deficit-spend.149 In contrast, the federal government can preserve 
the purpose of the program—providing a safety net for the poor—
through its ability to deficit spend.150  
All states (except Vermont) are required to balance their 
budgets annually.151 Therefore, a state would be foolish to adopt a 
Medicaid program as expansive as that under the federal 
entitlement, only to have a recession force them to make cuts to 
 
 144. See id. at 5. 
 145. See Bagley, supra note 47, at 3–4. 
 146. See id. at 10; see also Lambrew, supra note 1, at 59 (“[I]t is unlikely that the current 
level of Medicaid enrollment could be sustained under most block grant policies.”). 
 147. See Bagley, supra note 47, at 10 (“When a recession hits . . . [t]he ranks of those 
eligible for Medicaid and for ACA subsidies will predictably grow, leading to larger 
federal outlays.”). 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. at 10–11. 
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eligibility and benefits.152 State solutions to a recession, such as 
raising taxes or cutting benefits, would likely only accelerate the 
recession.153 From this standpoint, it not only makes sense, it is also 
necessary to have the federal government retain control over 
Medicaid to be able to account for the uncertain economic times 
ahead and to keep Medicaid consistent with its purpose as a safety 
net for the 19% of the United States population that relies on it.154 
The second restriction on states is a federal law—the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)—which arguably 
prohibits states from creating laws requiring or punishing 
employers in their refusal to expand health coverage to their 
employees.155 Specifically, ERISA preempts state laws that relate to 
an employee’s benefit plan,156 which likely prohibits states from 
requiring employers to offer health insurance to their employees.157 
 
 152. See id. at 11. Bagley explains this concept further with the following example: 
  As the exception that proves the rule, Massachusetts is instructive. When it 
adopted statewide reform, Massachusetts had two advantages that no other state 
had. First, it had the lowest rate of uninsured in the country, meaning that its 
countercyclical obligations would be more modest than those of other states. 
Second, with the help of Senator Ted Kennedy, the state got a sweet-heart deal 
from the George W. Bush Administration offering it more than $1 billion in 
Medicaid funding to support a coverage expansion. Massachusetts could afford to 
bite the bullet. States without those advantages cannot—at least without the help 
from the federal government. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 153. See id. 
 154. See MEDICAID IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 20, at 1 (demonstrating the breadth 
of coverage the current federal Medicaid program provides). 
 155. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012); Bagley, supra note 47, at 12–15. 
 156. See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016) (indicating that state 
laws that have a “reference to” or an “impermissible connection to” ERISA will be 
preempted); see also Bd. of Trs. of Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. v. Chambers, 903 F.3d 829 
(9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the debt collection law limiting the amount of damages 
collectible from general contractors for debts of subcontractors as a traditional state function 
and not subject to ERISA preemption). 
 157. See EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T LABOR, MULTIPLE EMPLOYER 
WELFARE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT 
(ERISA): A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION 7 (rev. Aug. 2013), https://www. 
dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications 
/mewa-under-erisa-a-guide-to-federal-and-state-regulation.pdf (indicating that “virtually 
any type of health plan” will qualify as a benefit under a “welfare plan,” making it subject 
to ERISA preemption). There is an unresolved circuit split on this issue. See Golden Gate 
Rest. Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding 
an ordinance mandating the taxing of employers who failed to provide health insurance by 
reasoning that an employer who paid the tax wasn’t intruding on ERISA); Retail Indus. 
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Notwithstanding this, it is unlikely that Congress will use its only 
remedy available—amending the ERISA law—as powerful lobbies 
are certainly resistant to such an idea.158 In effect, states are 
powerless to implement any form of a replacement equivalent to 
the federal entitlement if block granting Medicaid were to occur, 
making it necessary to keep Medicaid as a federal entitlement if it 
is to stay true to its intended purpose. 
C. A Fiscally Conservative Approach 
Recent studies have analyzed the effects of the expanded 
Medicaid coverage for different populations, the resulting effects 
on those populations’ economies and beneficiaries, as well as the 
cost to implement the Medicaid program itself.159 The findings 
suggest large downstream savings by providing early treatment to 
beneficiaries as well as immediate economic benefits from insuring 
the uninsured through the influx of federal funding.160 An 
expansion of these studies’ concepts, compared with the conse-
quences of uncompensated care a lack of coverage creates, provides 
support for the idea that block granting Medicaid would exacerbate 
exactly what its proponents suggest it would solve. Therefore, to 
meet both conservative and liberal Medicaid objectives, Medicaid 
should be expanded due to the long-term savings it may provide, 
the potential of immediate and long-term economic benefits 
provided, and the impact such expansion could have on Medicaid 
beneficiaries and society.  
1. Long-term savings 
New studies have focused on the downstream costs associated 
with different treatment options, most recently regarding drugs 
 
Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007) (striking down a law in Maryland 
similar to the law in Golden Gate Restaurant Association). 
 158. See Bagley, supra note 47, at 12. 
 159. See Nirosha Mahendraratnam et al., Prescription Drug Utilization and Reimbursement 
Increased Following State Medicaid Expansion in 2014, 23 J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY 
PHARMACY 355 (2017) [hereinafter Prescription Drug Utilization and Reimbursement]; Zobair 
Younossi et al., Treating Medicaid Patients with Hepatitis C: Clinical and Economic Impact, 23 AM. 
J. MANAGED CARE 107 (2017) [hereinafter Treating Medicaid Patients with Hepatitis C]. 
 160. See Prescription Drug Utilization and Reimbursement, supra note 159, at 355; Treating 
Medicaid Patients with Hepatitis C, supra note 159, at 107. 
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treating the hepatitis C virus (HCV).161 In a study published in The 
American Journal of Managed Care, researchers examined differing 
state Medicaid policies for the treatment of HCV (i.e., some states 
offering coverage at most stages of disease progression, others not 
offering any coverage, others still determining what they would 
offer, and some states only offering Medicaid treatment for HCV at 
advanced fibrosis).162 
The study found that most state Medicaid policies delayed 
treatment of HCV until it reached an advanced stage, with many 
only receiving treatment when the beneficiary transferred to 
Medicare.163 This delay added significantly to the difficulty of the 
treatment, as the disease had often advanced to a more critical 
stage.164 The study also found other systematic flaws, including the 
fact that when the HCV Medicaid population aged into Medicare 
the needed Medicare-level drugs had much less favorable 
discounts as compared to Medicaid (had they been approved for 
the beneficiary), thus increasing the costs to Medicare by treating a 
more advanced version of the disease at a more expensive rate.165 
The study highlighted the financial impact of these policies by 
mentioning that the average HCV liver transplant costs $188,000 
and stating that “[t]he current Medicaid strategy was estimated to 
result in 27,000 excess cases of cirrhosis and almost 10,000 excess 
cases of decompensated cirrhosis, leading to over 1700 liver 
transplants, nearly 8000 cases of HCC [hepatocellular carcinoma 
 
 161. See Treating Medicaid Patients with Hepatitis C, supra note 159, at 107. 
 162. See id. at 110. The study that the authors used as the basis of the Hepatitis 
information in the article provides important information on the variety of policies states use 
to treat this disease. See Soumitri Barua et al., Restrictions for Medicaid Reimbursement of 
Sofosbuvir for the Treatment of Hepatitis C Virus Infection in the United States, 163 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 215, 219 (2015) (“Of the 42 states, including the District of Columbia, with 
known Medicaid reimbursement criteria for sofosbuvir, 81% (n = 34) restrict reimbursement 
on the basis of liver disease stage . . . . In 4 states (10%), reimbursement is restricted only to 
persons with cirrhosis . . . . In two thirds of states (n = 27), sofosbuvir reimbursement is 
restricted to persons with advanced fibrosis . . . or cirrhosis . . . . In 2 states (5%), 
reimbursement is also provided for those with moderate fibrosis . . . and in 1 state for mild 
fibrosis . . . . In the remaining states, no reimbursement criteria are based on disease state (n 
= 8 [19%]).”). 
 163. See Treating Medicaid Patients with Hepatitis C, supra note 159, at 110. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
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(liver cancer)], and over 16,000 HCV-related deaths.”166 The study’s 
authors believed that HCV coverage should be provided earlier to 
all HCV Medicaid beneficiaries, which would not only save 
Medicare money but would improve the quality of life for many 
HCV beneficiaries.167 
The study noted that the drawback of covering all HCV 
Medicaid beneficiaries would be the requirement of a sizeable 
amount of up-front money to finance such medications and 
procedures.168 However, the study also found that treating all HCV 
Medicaid beneficiaries with an early intervention HCV medication, 
regardless of what disease development stage the HCV beneficiary 
was in, had significant consequences.169 Specifically, the study 
estimated that with early intervention treatments there would have 
been “36,752 fewer cases of cirrhosis; 1739 fewer liver transplants; 
8169 fewer cases of hepatocellular carcinoma; 16,173 fewer HCV-
related deaths; 0.84 additional life-years per patient; and 1.03 
additional quality-adjusted life-years per patient.”170 The financial 
consequences of this proposal would have resulted in a 39.4% ($3.8 
billion) Medicare savings, consequently decreasing the down-
stream treatment costs by 18.3%.171 
The results from The American Journal of Modern Care study 
provide a foundation for two conclusions regarding the fiscal 
 
 166. Id. at 107–10. 
 167. See id. at 111. The study advocates a position that is in direct contrast to the 
principles of a Medicaid block grant, as the study notes: 
  Institution of a less restrictive “treat all” strategy in Medicaid patients was 
associated with clinical outcome and cost benefits. Based on these data, we believe 
it is time to develop a national strategy to eradicate HCV from the United States 
regardless of payer status. Such a strategy requires collaboration among private 
payers, governmental payers (including Medicaid), healthcare providers, drug 
manufacturers, and patients. 
Id. 
 168. See id. The authors of the study acknowledge an immediate hurdle to implement-
ing their proposal, but suggest: 
Given the large number of patients with HCV, we acknowledge that such a 
strategy would require up-front investment in the context of state Medicaid 
budget constraints; however, this strategy would ultimately lead to cost savings 
for CMS by reducing the future burden to Medicare and the costs associated with 
HCV morbidity and mortality. 
Id. 
 169. See id. at 107. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. 
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analysis of a Medicaid block grant. First, while this study focused 
exclusively on the delayed treatment of HCV, it reasonable to 
suggest that high Medicaid and Medicare costs can also be 
attributed to the delayed treatment of other diseases in addition to 
HCV.172 This information provides a powerful argument for those 
looking at the fiscal impact of the Medicaid and Medicare programs 
on the federal budget by suggesting that the most fiscally 
responsible policy would be to adjust internal Medicaid policies to 
allow for early treatments of HCV and other diseases.173 
Consequently, adjusting internal Medicaid policies to allow for 
earlier treatments of a variety of diseases would trade more up-
front money for exponentially greater future savings.174 This first 
 
 172. See, e.g., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT SECTION 4108: MEDICAID INCENTIVES FOR 
PREVENTION OF CHRONIC DISEASES (MIPCD) 5 (Feb. 23, 2011), https://innovation.cms.gov 
/Files/fact-sheet/MIPCD-Funding-Opportunity-Announcement.pdf (“Interventions that 
address the behavioral or social circumstances that influence participation in preventive 
health services and/or otherwise have a positive impact on outcomes of preventive health 
services may contribute to improving health and decrease growth in health care 
expenditures.”); Jonathan C. Javitt et al., Preventative Eye Care in People With Diabetes Is Cost-
Saving to the Federal Government, 17 DIABETES CARE 909, 912 (1994) (finding that if all patients 
were to receive recommended ophthalmological care, it would result in a $427.1 million 
dollar annual savings (1994) to the federal government). 
 173. See Treating Medicaid Patients with Hepatitis C, supra note 159, at 108 (“It has been 
well established that universal, immediate treatment with these all-oral, interferon-free 
highly effective targeted regimens is cost-effective and decreases downstream medical costs, 
due primarily to the avoidance of liver-related complications. Furthermore, in the United 
States, marketplace competition has reduced the net cost of these drugs as manufacturers 
provide substantial discounts for Medicaid patients. Despite these factors, a recent study 
from the TRIO registry found that Medicaid was the least likely payer to cover HCV 
treatment.”). Ten states participated in the Section 4108 program by creating programs that 
targeted early prevention of chronic diseases by implementing programs that were gauged 
to change behaviors that increased susceptibility to chronic disease. See RTI INT’L, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID INCENTIVES FOR PREVENTION OF CHRONIC DISEASES 
75–76 (Apr. 2017), https://downloads.cms.gov/files/cmmi/mipcd-finalevalrpt.pdf [herein-
after MEDICAID INCENTIVES] (“The MIPCD States demonstrated that they and other States 
can successfully implement incentive programs in Medicaid, although implementing these 
programs was more challenging and required significantly more time planning and greater 
flexibility in implementing than States originally anticipated. Clearly, the saying, ‘build it 
and they will come’ does not translate into a successful Medicaid incentive program—just 
providing incentives for adopting healthy behaviors was not sufficient. States struggled with 
delays in implementing programs and in getting participants to enroll, resulting in only two 
States (Hawaii and Texas) reaching their enrollment targets. Collectively, actual enrollment 
was about 70 percent of target enrollment.”). 
 174. See Treating Medicaid Patients with Hepatitis C, supra note 159, at 111 (“Given the 
large number of patients with HCV, we acknowledge that such a strategy would require up-
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conclusion also suggests that block granting Medicaid would be 
fiscally irresponsible simply because it would impede early 
intervention of (presumably less expensive) treatments with likely 
cuts to enrollment and benefits.175 
Second, adjusting Medicaid and Medicare’s external policies to 
allow for expanded medical coverage of the uninsured—combined 
with the early treatments of the first conclusion—could provide 
significant savings to the federal government.176 For example, the 
earlier potential beneficiaries get covered under Medicaid, the 
sooner they can seek presumably less expensive preventative care 
 
front investment in the context of state Medicaid budget constraints; however, this strategy 
would ultimately lead to cost savings for CMS by reducing the future burden to Medicare 
and the costs associated with HCV morbidity and mortality.”). For a variety of diseases, the 
major difficulty is going to be how to provide the necessary incentives to motivate 
beneficiaries to engage in preventive care—as preventive care will not always be about 
accessibility to a medication. See MEDICAID INCENTIVES, supra note 173, at 255–56 (“Looking 
at the benefit chain, we first know from the analysis of MIPCD State MDS in Section 4 that 
incentives increase the use of preventive services for most of the programs’ target areas 
(Table 9-1). Thus, the necessary, but not sufficient condition for improvements in short-term 
health outcomes is met. Second, the State evaluation reports provide mixed evidence about 
whether incentives lead to improvements in short-term health outcomes. In diabetes 
prevention programs, incentives were associated with significantly higher percentages of 
participants reaching weight loss goals in two of the three States measuring this variable, but 
the average weight loss did not differ significantly between the incentive and control groups 
in these States. Incentives seemed to have a clearer effect on smoking cessation rates: 
cessation rates were higher for the incentive group in four of the five States that focused on 
smoking cessation. The improvement in cessation rates ranged from 4.0 to 9.8 percentage 
points. Incentives appeared to have no effect on short-term outcomes for blood pressure, 
although only a couple of State programs assessed this outcome. In Texas, the wellness pro-
gram was associated with a significant improvement in a common measure of overall 
health.”). This might be a partial solution to the high costs associated with super-utilizers. 
See JOSHUA M. WIENER ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., STRATEGIES TO REDUCE MEDICAID SPEND-
ING: FINDINGS FROM A LITERATURE REVIEW 7 (June 2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment 
/Issue-Brief-Strategies-to-Reduce-Medicaid-Spending-Findings-from-a-Literature-Review 
(“Medicaid programs, health systems, and communities are experimenting with efficient 
and effective approaches to identifying and engaging with high-cost, high-use enrollees, 
commonly referred to as super-utilizers. The expectation is that targeted, often intense care 
management of these individuals will lead to reductions in unnecessary use and greater 
connections to needed community-based resources. Controlling costs in this population can 
have a significant impact on total Medicaid spending given that an estimated 5% of Medicaid 
beneficiaries with complex medical and psychosocial needs account for 54% of total 
Medicaid spending.”). 
 175. See supra Part I. 
 176. See Treating Medicaid Patients with Hepatitis C, supra note 159, at 110 (“Under the 
current scenario of Medicaid LDV/SOF restrictions, the total costs of treating the HCV cohort 
totaled $9.7 billion, with the majority of costs (50.4%) attributable to downstream costs of 
care (ie, [sic] hospitalization costs, outpatient costs, and non-LDV/SOF pharmacy costs).”). 
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or treatments, reducing downstream costs to both Medicaid and 
Medicare.177 This would allow more people to enter Medicare 
having been previously covered under Medicaid, resulting in the 
per-beneficiary costs of Medicare being reduced.178 In sum, this 
second conclusion is an excellent example of effective, long-term 
planning, the streamlining of inefficient or duplicative programs, 
and the limiting of uncontrollable spending.  
2. Economic benefits 
A study in The Journal of Managed Care & Specialty Pharmacy 
found that after a one-year period, states that had implemented the 
ACA Medicaid expansion realized a 17% increase in prescription 
drug usage and a 36.1% increase in prescription reimbursements 
compared to the quarter before expansion.179 Additionally, of the 
eight Medicaid expansion states surveyed, they collectively 
averaged both a 1.4 million prescription-per-quarter and a 
$163 million dollar-per-quarter increase in utilization and reim-
bursement compared to the change in rates of the ten nonexpansion 
states surveyed.180  
These findings suggest Medicaid expansion allows patients 
who were previously uninsured to have access to needed 
 
 177. See id. (“Although the largest cost savings were attributable to downstream 
medical cost offsets, pharmacy costs attributable to LDV/SOF treatment decreased 2%, from 
$4.84 billion to $4.75 billion; this is due in part to the 9618 patients potentially eligible for 
LDV/SOF 8W treatment under Medicaid at the onset of the model who age into Medicare 
as compensated cirrhotics and can only receive treatment with the 12W regimen. Additional 
LDV/SOF cost savings result from treating a larger number of patients under Medicaid and 
the lower price for LDV/SOF under this scheme versus Medicare ($31,500 vs $83,108.18 
[inflation-adjusted future price] for LDV/SOF 8W.”). 
 178. See id. (“Under the current scenario of Medicaid LDV/SOF restrictions, the 
aggregate cost per SVR across the entire patient cohort—patients treated in Medicaid, 
patients treated in Medicare, and patients unable to be treated—was $51,809. Treating all 
Medicaid patients with LDV/SOF led to a 19.8% ($10,282) savings per SVR and was 
dominant from a cost-effectiveness (cost per life-year gained, cost per QALY gained) 
standpoint, given that earlier treatment with LDV/SOF resulted in better health and 
cost outcomes.”). 
 179. See Prescription Drug Utilization and Reimbursement, supra note 159, at 359. 
 180. See id. at 357. “Conversely, the nonexpansion states studied saw a 2% decrease in 
prescription drug usage with a 6.3% increase in prescription drug reimbursement in the same 
time frame.” Id. at 359. 
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prescription drugs;181 similarly, these findings also suggest that 
increased utilization of prescription drug usage and reimburse-
ment occurs as individuals have access to health insurance.182 While 
this study was specifically limited to the pharmaceutical industry, 
the successes of prescription drug reimbursement through 
Medicaid expansion ought to incentivize further studies of the 
correlations of health access, health outcomes, and corresponding 
economic outcomes.183 Notwithstanding the conclusions such 
research might yield, the current prescription drug use and 
reimbursement results from expanding coverage provide a strong 
argument to expand health insurance access due to its beneficial 
impact on both beneficiaries and state healthcare industries. 
On a more intimate level, expanding Medicaid coverage is 
likely to produce economic effects that improve the quality of life 
of beneficiaries.184 Specifically, a study that sought to determine the 
effect of Medicaid expansion on personal bankruptcies “found a 
 
 181. See id. (“[T]he increased rate of prescriptions per quarter in the expansions states 
in the period after expansion suggests that Medicaid expansion offered new and vulnerable 
patients, who were previously uninsured increased access to prescription drugs.”). 
 182. See id. at 360. The authors of the study explained their inferences with 
the following: 
  Similar to our analysis, previous studies and reports have estimated that 
Medicaid prescription expenditures increased by 24.3% in the whole population, 
24.6% among expansion states, and 14.1% in nonexpansion states between 2013 
and 2014. Furthermore, it has been estimated that expansion states and 
nonexpansion states increased the number of Medicaid prescriptions by 25.4% and 
2.8%, respectively. This study adds to this growing body of literature by 
examining the effect of Medicaid expansion on prescription drug use and 
reimbursement trends over time. 
Id. 
 183. See MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 8. The Kaiser Family 
Foundation has predicted that results, such as those from the study under discussion, would 
occur, explaining: 
Medicaid spending flows through a state’s economy and can generate impacts 
greater than the original spending alone. The infusion of federal dollars into the 
state’s economy results in a multiplier effect, directly affecting not only the 
providers who received Medicaid payments for the services they provide to 
beneficiaries, but indirectly affecting other businesses and industries as well. More 
recent analyses find positive effects of the Medicaid expansion on multiple 
economic outcomes, despite Medicaid enrollment growth initially exceeding 
projections in many states. Studies show that states expanding Medicaid under the 
ACA have realized budget savings, revenue gains, and overall economic growth. 
Id. 
 184. See Tal Gross & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, Health Insurance and the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Decision: Evidence from Expansions of Medicaid, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 767, 776 (2011). 
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significant interaction between these two types of insurance: a 10 
percentage point increase in Medicaid eligibility would decrease 
bankruptcies by about 8%.”185 Even more, after recognizing that 
“Medicaid expansion appears to lead to greater transfers from 
debtors to creditors,” the study suggested that economic effects of 
fewer bankruptcies might induce lenders to lower prices to 
other borrowers.186 
Expanding Medicaid coverage has been found to improve the 
overall financial health in low-income families.187 A study found 
that making one additional family member Medicaid eligible 
reduced family “medical spending by 2.7 percentage points” per 
quarter.188 Furthermore, this study found that even with the effects 
of “crowd-out”—where Medicaid expansion crowds out private 
coverage—expansion still led to decreased medical spending and 
overall welfare improvements.189  
Expanding Medicaid coverage may also provide savings for the 
federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.190 Providing 
financial assistance for poor adults with disabilities inhibiting their 
ability to work, SSI qualification usually guarantees Medicaid 
eligibility.191 Analyzing the twelve states that introduced Medicaid 
coverage for childless adults between 2001 and 2013,192 researchers 
 
 185. Id. (“A 10 percentage point increase in Medicaid eligibility is itself an enormous 
expansion of social insurance. But in the 1990s, bankruptcies increased by roughly 5% each 
year. Out results therefore suggest that a massive expansion of Medicaid would prevent 
about one year of 1990’s-era growth in consumer bankruptcies.”). 
 186. Id. at 777. 
 187. See Marcus Dillender, Medicaid, Family Spending, and the Financial Implications of 
Crowd-out, 53 J. HEALTH ECON. 1 (2016). 
 188. Id. at 13 (“Although much of this decrease appears to come from families who had 
small medical expenditures, I cannot rule out meaningful decreases in large 
expenditure risks.”). 
 189. See id. at 14 (“In short, Medicaid realizes its intended effect of reducing medical 
expenditures for low-income families, but focusing solely on Medicaid’s effect on medical 
expenditures ignores a major part of Medicaid’s contribution to low-income families’ 
financial health.”). 
 190. See Marguerite Burns & Laura Dague, The Effect of Expanding Medicaid Eligibility on 
Supplemental Security Income Program Participation, 149 J. PUB. ECON. 20 (2017). 
 191. See id. at 20 (“Historically, participation in the SSI program has served as the 
primary route to Medicaid coverage for adults with disabilities.”). 
 192. See id. at 23 (“These include the following: ten states that introduced and 
maintained Medicaid coverage for childless adults, CA, CO, CT, IN, IA, ME, MD, MI, UT, 
WI; one state that introduced and discontinued childless adult coverage, PA; and one state 
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found that this Medicaid expansion led to a reduction in SSI 
participation of 5%–7%.193 Consequently, using the 5%–7% figure, 
this same study estimates that “a reduction of this size translates 
into a reduction in beneficiaries of 31,600 to 44,280 and a decrease 
of $6.6 to $9.3 million in federal SSI payments for each enrollment 
month within the 12 affected states.”194 
Interestingly, expanding Medicaid has also been shown to 
reduce crime rates.195 One study examining the crime-reduction 
effect of state Medicaid expansions under the Health Insurance 
Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) waivers found that a 10% 
increase in substance use disorder (SUD) treatments could “reduce 
the rate of robbery by 3%, reduce the rate of aggravated assault by 
6 to 7%, and reduce the rate of larceny theft by 3%.”196 
Understanding that crimes have economic costs,197 after listing the 
annual costs of such crimes,198 this study calculated that a 10% 
increase of the $16 billion dollars (2007) spent on SUD treatments 
at a cost of “$1.6 billion can yield an average benefit of $2.9 billion 
 
the discontinued Medicaid coverage for childless adults that had been introduced before 
2001, TN.”). 
 193. See id. at 31. 
 194. Id. (“While these dollar amounts may be imprecise, this stylized estimate conveys 
the magnitude of the program-level effects following the new Medicaid coverage for 
childless adults in the study states on SSI participation. Additionally, we may expect gains 
in efficiency to the extent that the higher income and asset thresholds for Medicaid expansion 
(relative to SSI) reduce labor supply distortions. This study’s findings signal the importance 
of evaluating the cross-program effects of the ACA expansions to capture the full 
implications of increased Medicaid availability on public welfare spending and labor force 
participation among low-income adults.”). 
 195. See Hefei Wen et al., The Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Crime Reduction: Evidence 
from HIFA-Waiver Expansions, 154 J. PUB. ECON. 67, 67 (2017); see also Susan L. Ettner et al., 
Benefit-Cost in the California Treatment Outcome Project: Does Substance Abuse Treatment “Pay 
for Itself”?, 41 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 192, 205–06 (“Our best estimate is that on average, 
substance abuse treatment costs $1,583 and is associated with a societal benefit of $11,487, 
representing a 7:1 ratio of benefits to costs (9:1 when arrest data are ‘inflated’ to proxy for 
actual crimes committed).”). 
 196. The Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Crime Reduction, supra note 195, at 79. 
 197. See id. (“These estimated costs of crime attempt to capture the direct tangible losses 
to crime victims and to the criminal justice system, the opportunity costs associated with the 
criminal’s choice to engage in illegal rather than legal activities, as well as indirect and 
intangible losses suffered by crime victims, including pain and suffering, decreased quality 
of life, and psychological distress.”). 
 198. See id. (“[T]he annual costs are roughly $15 billion to $19 billion for robbery, $8 to 
$25 billion for aggravated assault, and $65 billion to $92 billion for larceny theft 
(2008 dollars).”). 
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to $5.1 billion from reducing crime rates.”199 Echoing this study’s 
conclusion, expanding Medicaid to provide earlier treatments “is 
an effective policy lever to encourage treatment use and reduce 
substance use, which in turn, can cost-effectively reduce crimes.”200 
Expanding coverage with a preventative approach will 
certainly necessitate upfront spending. But taxpayers will foot the 
bill either way. For example, in 2013—the last year before the ACA 
went into effect, and possibly indicative of the costs with a 
Medicaid block grant—the federal government paid $32.8 billion 
(61.5%) of the year’s total uncompensated care, with states and 
other localities contributing $19.8 billion (37.1%) themselves.201 
Alarmingly, despite these enormous amounts paid in 
uncompensated care, studies suggest that hospitals still absorb 
between 60% and 67% of the costs of their uncompensated care,202 
putting many at risk of closure.203 Hospitals are not well situated to 
pass that cost on to insured consumers either,204 putting those that 
serve more uninsured patients at a greater risk for closure 
compared to other hospitals.205 These consequences are likely not 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See THE KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
UNCOMPENSATED CARE FOR THE UNINSURED IN 2013 14 (2014), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation 
.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/8596-uncompensated-care-for-the-uninsured-in-2013.pdf. 
 202. See Craig Garthwaite et al., Hospitals as Insurers of Last Resort 38 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21290, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21290.pdf. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. at 36. The authors of the study explain how it is difficult for hospitals to shift 
the costs of the uninsured to others, suggesting: 
  The attractiveness of cost-shifting arguments to policymakers is obvious. 
However, there is not strong theoretical or empirical support for this argument. 
Theoretically, it is unclear how hospitals could raise prices on one group of 
patients following a lump-sum financial shock from another group. If hospitals 
were maximizing profits, then prices should have been optimal before the shock. 
For a price increase to be the optimal response to a financial shock requires two 
conditions. First, the hospital must possess some degree of pricing power in the 
private insurance market. Second, the hospital must not have fully exercised this 
power prior to the shock. 
Id. 
 205. See id. at 40. The researchers in the study made the following conclusions regarding 
uncompensated care and hospital closures: 
  Similarly, [other researchers] found that from 1990 to 2009, approximately 
30 percent of the nation’s EDs closed, primarily due to hospital closures. ED 
closures were more likely to occur in low-income areas and at hospitals with low 
profit margins. Our results indicate that an ED attracts a large amount of 
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limited to just hospitals, as it can be deduced that near 40% of 
uncompensated care is provided by an entity other than a hospital, 
which is likely to also be absorbing a significant portion of 
uncompensated-care costs.206  
“Medicaid is a lean program.”207 Due to lower payments to 
providers and lower administrative costs it is less expensive to 
insure someone on Medicaid than private insurance.208 In fact, over 
the period from 2007 to 2013, the increase in per-enrollee spending 
in the Medicaid program was 3.1%, which was less than private 
insurance pre-enrollee premiums.209 With Medicaid being the most 
cost-effective coverage available, instead of block granting Medi-
caid, serious consideration ought to be given to expanding 
Medicaid to cover more treatments and insure more people.  
These surveys provide evidence of expanded Medicaid 
coverage encouraging effective, long-term planning, the stream-
lining of inefficient or duplicative programs, and the limiting of 
uncontrollable spending. Therefore, this snapshot of the available 
research conducted on the effects of expanding Medicaid provides 
support for the fact that conservative Medicaid goals are still 
obtainable under an expanded Medicaid program focused on an 
early intervention model of Medicaid funding.  
3. Access to care correlates with increased preventive care 
It may appear as if these two different approaches to Medicaid 
would have the same economic impact on the state level. After all, 
a necessary objective of any successful approach must be to curb 
unsustainable spending. And one could argue that the expansion 
of coverage with a focus on preventive care merely redirects the 
large sums of money currently spent on hospital care for the 
 
uncompensated care to a hospital, with sharp increases in uncompensated care 
when nearby hospitals close. This may explain why areas with low rates of health 
insurance have seen so many ED closures in recent years. 
Id. 
 206. See id. at 38. 
 207. INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAID, supra note 6, at 4 (“And over the past decade, costs 
per beneficiary grew much more slowly for Medicaid than for employer-sponsored 
insurance. The . . . Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services projects that Medicaid 
spending per beneficiary will grow no more rapidly through 2025 than spending per 
beneficiary with private insurance.”). 
 208. See id. 
 209. See MEDICAID FINANCING: THE BASICS, supra note 6, at 4. 
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chronically ill to another part of the healthcare industry where the 
focus is on early treatment. The expenses that were attributable to 
hospital care would simply be shifted elsewhere on preventive care 
for more individuals—with total expenses remaining unchanged. 
But that is not the case. Aside from the economic gains that may 
come from the examples mentioned above, the real gains from 
expanding Medicaid will be seen in the quality of life gains 
available for beneficiaries through their utilization of their access 
to Medicaid.  
The most important reason why expanding Medicaid coverage 
is the better of the two policies is that it will provide more access to 
care which may lead to improved health-related behaviors and 
outcomes.210 A study that compared two Medicaid expansion states 
(Kentucky and Arkansas) with one non-expansion state (Texas) 
found a 14.0% one year decrease and a 22.7% two year decrease in 
the uninsured rate as compared to the baseline year.211 This access 
to care resulted in a 12.1% increase of beneficiaries having a 
personal physician, a 6.1% decrease in reliance on ER care, a 18.2% 
reduction in cost-related barriers to care, a 11.6% decrease in 
prescription medication skipping, and a 29.5% reduction in out-of-
pocket medical spending.212 Compared to Texas, Medicaid expan-
sion was also found to have resulted in a 16.1% increase in medical 
checkups, a 6.3% increase in a glucose check, a 10.7% increase in 
glucose monitoring, and a 12% increase in chronic condition care.213 
 
 210. See Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Changes in Utilization and Health Among Low-Income 
Adults After Medicaid Expansion or Expanded Private Insurance, 176 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL 
MED. 1501, 1507–08 (2016) (“After 2 years of coverage expansion in Kentucky and Arkansas, 
compared with Texas’s nonexpansion, there were major improvements in access to primary 
care and medications, affordability of care, utilization of preventive services, care for chronic 
conditions, and self-reported quality of care and health.”); see also Amy Finkelstein et al., The 
Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 17190, 2011), https://www.nber.org/papers/w17190.pdf 
(finding that insurance coverage correlated with preventive care, including a “20 percent 
increase in the probability of ever having one’s blood cholesterol checked, a 15 percent 
increase in the probability of ever having one’s blood tested for high blood sugar or diabetes, 
a 60 percent increase in the probability of having a mammogram within the last year (for 
women 40 and over), and a 45 percent change in the probability of having a pap test within 
the last year (for women)”). 
 211. See Sommers, supra note 210, at 1503. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. 
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Another study found that the “Medicaid expansion significantly 
increased the probability of receiving an HIV test in the past year 
by 2.3 percentage points” and “a 4.1 percentage point increase . . . 
in the probability of a dental visit.”214 Similar studies have found 
beneficiary usage of their expanded Medicaid coverage led to a 
“significant increase in rates of diagnosis of chronic health 
conditions” as well as “increases in respondent reports of . . . being 
diagnosed with diabetes and high cholesterol.”215 
This early evidence that increased Medicaid access has 
correlated with an increase in preventive care is in its infancy. 
Hopefully these early results will provide the necessary synergy to 
expand Medicaid access to benefit the lives of more people, which 
is a principle that both conservatives and liberals can agree on.  
III. CONCLUSION 
Despite the “sharp partisan disagreement” over its future, 
Medicaid appears durable.216 Medicaid’s durability is evidenced by 
the fact that Medicaid has changed significantly from its inception 
in 1965—beginning as almost an afterthought—to now becoming 
the program, according to some, capable of transitioning the United 
States to universal coverage.217 Despite the continuing challenges of 
Medicaid, according to Professor Michael S. Sparer, professor of 
 
 214. Kosali Simon et al., The Impact of Health Insurance on Preventive Care and Health 
Behaviors: Evidence from the First Two Years of the ACA Medicaid Expansions, 36 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 390, 404 (2017). 
 215. Laura R. Wherry & Sarah Miller, Early Coverage, Access, Utilization, and Health 
Effects of the Affordable Care Act Medicaid Expansions: A Quasi-Experimental Study 7 
(June 21, 2016) (author manuscript), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 
5021068/pdf/nihms807579.pdf. 
 216. See Drew Altman & William H. Frist, Medicare and Medicaid at 50 years: Perspectives 
of Beneficiaries, Health Care Professionals and Institutions, and Policy Makers, 314 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 384, 386–87 (2015). The study’s authors stated: 
Medicare and Medicaid are quite different today than 50 years ago, a potentially 
important lesson for the current debate over the ACA. . . . Medicaid has changed 
over the years to expand eligibility to cover more low-income Americans, provide 
coverage for 1 in 3 of the nation’s children, fill gaps in Medicare coverage for 
elderly and disabled people, facilitate development of long-term care services and 
supports in the community, and introduce delivery system reforms. 
Id. at 387. 
 217. See Sparer, supra note 1, at 1090. 
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health policy and management at Columbia University,218 Medi-
caid’s outlook appears promising: 
 Although it is not inevitable, Medicaid is most likely going to 
continue its remarkable growth. The interest-group support is not 
likely to fade, even if conservative politicians and underpaid 
office-based physicians remain opposed. Similarly, the US 
Supreme Court decision converting the ACA mandate into a 
state-controlled option may provide an unexpected and 
unintended political benefit, minimizing complaints of a 
monolithic national program and strengthening the program’s 
political support. Medicaid’s intergovernmental financing 
structure also will continue to encourage expansion; the federalist 
catalyst here is unlikely to disappear. Finally, politics aside, state 
Medicaid programs are now using their massive purchasing 
power to redesign the health care delivery system. Here again, the 
program’s federalist structure encourages innovations that are 
likely to meet the needs of diverse local markets.219 
If Professor Sparer’s predictions hold true—and history 
suggests they might—then the expanded Medicaid coverage that 
occurs will ensure that states retain their flexibility to implement 
their Medicaid programs as they desire. This expansion will 
simultaneously promote fiscal prudence and protect more potential 
beneficiaries by, among other things, allowing them access to early, 







 218. See id. at 1084. 
 219. Id. at 1090–91. 
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